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COMMENTS
The Rights of Prisoners to Medical Care and the
Implications For Drug-Dependent Prisoners and Pre-
trial Detainees
In recent years, there has been a growing sensitivity to the
medical needs of prisoners and pretrial detainees.1 The common
law right 2 to in-prison medical care has been codified in, and at
times broadened by, state legislation. Federal legislation designed
to guard the prisoner's medical well-being has been enacted.4 And,
perhaps most importantly, the notion of a constitutional right to in-
prison medical care, arising out of the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment and the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of due process, has shown renewed promise of
providing significant protection. 5
At the same time, there has also been a developing awareness
that new solutions to the problem of drug addiction are needed.
Many observers today believe that it is unnecessary to subject an
addict to the painful process of an abrupt, "cold turkey" withdrawal
in order to cure his physiological dependency,6 when the same result
can be achieved with relatively little pain7 through the use of metha-
done, a synthetic narcotic, administered in gradually decreasing
doses. This treatment is known as short-term detoxification.
Yet surveys of local jails indicated that in 1970, 49 percent of the 3300 jails surveyed
had no medical facilities whatsoever, and, in 1972, 65.5 percent had only first aid facilities.
R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHmrro 83, 86 (1975).
2 See text and notes at notes 9-11 infra.
See text and notes at notes 12-27 infra.
See text and notes at notes 28-39 infra.
See text and notes at notes 40-78 infra. For an exhaustive list of cases concerning the
issue of medical aid for prisoners, see ABA Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal
Services, Prisoners' Legal Rights: A Bibliography of Cases and Articles, PRI. L. REP. 18 (Spec.
ed. 1974). See generally, R. GOLDFARB, supra note 1; H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS
OF THE CONVICTED 433 (1974); SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING
RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED (W. S. McAninch & E. D. Wedlock, eds.) (1972) [hereinafter cited
as THE EMERGING RIGHTS]; Sneidman, Prisoners and Medical Treatment: Their Rights &
Remedies, 4 CRIM. L. BUL. 450 (1968); Zalman, Prisoners' Right to Medical Care, 63 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCl. 185 (1972); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
See text and notes at notes 94-95 infra.
See text and notes at notes 96-103 infra.
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Methadone may also be used as a long-term narcotic surrogate
which, when combined with a variety of social services, apparently
produces a less physically and socially destructive dependency than
the use of illegally purchased heroin.8
The important issue raised by these contemporaneous develop-
ments is whether a drug-dependent prisoner or pretrial detainee
can demand either form of methadone treatment under the common
law, state or federal statutes, or the United States Constitution.
This comment first examines the various non-constitutional rights
to medical care, both in geieral and in their application to drug-
dependent prisoners. The constitutional right to medical care is
then examined and the two standards used by the federal courts to
define this right-one restrictive and one more protective of pris-
ioner's rights-are explained. It is then suggested that narcotics ad-
diction is a disease requiring medical treatment and that short-
term methadone detoxification is the generally accepted medical
"cure." Finally, the comment applies the two constitutional stan-
dards to the disease of addiction in order to determine if, under
either rubric, the drug-dependent prisoner or pretrial detainee is
entitled to short-term methadone detoxification or to long-term
methadone maintenance.
I. THE PRISONER'S NON-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
MEDICAL CARE AND DRUG TREATMENT
A. Common Law Rights
State courts have long recognized that prison authorities have
a common law duty to provide in-prison medical care, on the theory
that "[i]t is but just that the public be required to care for the
prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty,
care for himself."9 A prisoner who has been injured by the negligence
of a prison official or the medical malpractice of a prison physician
has a common law tort action based on a breach of that duty.'0 For
See text and notes at notes 104-111 infra.
Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926).
1O See, e.g., Irwin v. State, 117 Ga. App. 1, 159 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1967); Hight v. New York,
35 Misc.2d 926, 231 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (inmate, confined to prison hospital, received
$15,000 as compensation for negligence of prison hospital employees). Some states immunize
the prison warden from tort liability on the theory that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.
See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963) (listing cases). Federal courts, in
dismissing eighth amendment claims, often note that the plaintiff's proper action is a state
law tort claim. See, e.g., Nettles v. Rundles, 453 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1971).
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the drug-dependent prisoner desiring methadone detoxification,
however, the negligence action appears to offer little hope for relief:
unless the use of methadone becomes so generally accepted that its
denial to an addict constitutes per se malpractice, it would be diffi-
cult to show negligence in the conscious decision not to provide
short-term detoxification. 11
B. Statutory Rights to Medical Care
1. State Statutes. Most states have enacted legislation defin-
ing the general standard of medical care to be provided in the state's
prisons and jails. A few statutes also define the specific treatment
to be provided drug-dependent prisoners. Yet broad, imprecise lan-
guage, coupled with a paucity of reported judicial interpretation,
often makes it difficult to ascertain the scope and effectiveness of
these provisions.
The prisoner's right to general medical care is defined in var-
ious ways. Nearly twenty states simply require a supervisory prison
official to provide medical and health services.12 Other state statutes
impose narrower and more specific duties on prison officials: a duty
to examine each prisoner on entrance to the jail or prison;13 a duty
to provide special treatment, including isolation, for prisoners with
communicable diseases;" or a duty to transfer a prisoner to another
" A related problem is that the value of the negligence action seems limited because the
sole available remedy is compensatory. Although money damages will lie for injury caused
by negligent care, injunctive relief is not available because negligent care, by its very nature,
cannot be anticipated. Furthermore, since abrupt withdrawal causes only temporary, albeit
severe pain, a prisoner would be unable to show that he would be irreparably harmed by the
choice of abrupt withdrawal as treatment. Yet the lack of an injunctive remedy would proba-
bly have at most a minor impact on the drug-dependent prisoner's medical well-being. The
prison authorities would undoubtedly prescribe a detoxificant voluntarily if they knew that
the prisoner would be entitled to compensation in the event they failed to do so.
"2 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 11; ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 125 (1958); ALASKA STAT. ch.
33, § 30.050 (Supp. 1974); Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 201.01 (Supp. 1974); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. ch. 24, § 442 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. ch. 77, § 309(e) (1973); IDAHO CODE ch. 20,
§ 209 (Supp. 1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-2 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 11, §§ 1-1.1-
21.9, 1-1.1-30.5 (Bums 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 338.1 (1973); Miss. CODE ANN. ch. 47, § 1-57
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 13, § 221.120 (Vernon 1962); NEB. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 181 (1971);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 619-9 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 42, § 2-4 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN.
ch. 41, §§ 1115, 1226 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 64, §§ 9-13, 9-19, 9-20 (1961); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 18-299 (1959).
"s See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 353-10 (1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 16 (1972);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 632 (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-3-1 (Supp. 1973); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. ch. 24, § 2-4 (1967); WASH. AD. CODE § 275-92-030 (1973).
," See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 19, § 60 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 14, § 84
(1969); TENN. CODE ANN. ch. 41, § 318 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 64, § 9-53 (1961); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-81, 32-82 (1973) (penitentiaries, jails).
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facility if the available treatment is inadequate.1 5
The standards of care imposed by these general statutes are
usually vague; thus, in over two-thirds of the states, authority is
delegated to either a state administrative agency or a state court to
promulgate more thorough regulations." Some regulations" are as
broad and imprecise as the statutes themselves, using terms such
as "commensurate with good medical practice" to define the general
level of prison medical care. 18 Others are more specific, defining, for
example, when care is to be available, 9 the circumstances under
,1 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. ch. 77, § 309 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. ch. 12, § 5-1-5 (Bums
1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 75, § 5249 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 698 (1957);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 90A (Supp. 1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 623-1 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. ch. 30, § 4-7 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-185 (1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-1-16
(Supp. 1974).
,1 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ch. 33, § 30.030 (Supp. 1974); CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058 (West
1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, § 81 (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6517 (1975);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. ch. 24, § 945.21 (1967); FA. STAT. ANN. ch. 46, § 945.21 (1963); GA.
CODE ANN. ch. 77, § 307 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 353-3 (1968); IDAHO CODE tit. 20, § 212
(1948); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-7-1 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 218.4 (1973); KAN. STAT.
ANN. ch. 76, §§ 5251, 5256 (Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 361, § 3 and ch. 513, § 274
(1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 15, §§ 702, 709, 854 (West Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 34, § 7 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 676 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 124, § 1 (Supp.
1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 14, § 791.206 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. tit. 13, § 216.020(6) (Vernon
1962); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 622.5 (1955); N.M. STAT. Ann. ch. 42, § 1-1.1 (1972); N.Y.
CORREC. LAW § 112 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 148, § 11 (Supp. 1974); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-44-04 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 302.203 (Page Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 57, § 42 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 421.016 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1473
(Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-1-2 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 55-303, 55-383 (1962);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. ch. 24, § 1-15-20 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 64, § 9-2 (1961); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 101, 102 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 23 (1974); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 72.13.170 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.04, 53.02, 53.07 (Supp. 1974) (as inter-
preted by 46 Op. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 280 (1957)).
17 The following discussion is based on information obtained in response to inquiries sent
to the fifty state departments of corrections. Twenty-four responses were received.
,S See, e.g., ARIZONA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, PROPOSED MANUAL OF MEDICAL CORR'L
STANDS. I 1, 2; CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR ch. 4,
art. 7 (1974) (reasonable care); GEORGIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RULES AND REG. § 125-2-9-.01
(1974) (needed medical or hospital care); CORRECTIONS DIVISION, HAWAII DEP'T OF SOCIAL
SERVICES & HOUSING, HEALTH & MEDICAL SERVICES IN THE CORRECTIONS DIVISION (1972) (ade-
quate health and medical services); ILLINOIS DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, AD. REG. § 836; KANSAS
DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS & INSTITUTIONS, KA'NSAS AD. PROCEDURE No. 130, STANDARDS FOR
HEALTH CARE IN DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS & INSTITUTIONS (proper and adequate care); MARYLAND
DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS REG. No. 130-2
(1974); MICHIGAN DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE No. R-3 (1973) (health care consis-
tent with prevailing standards for non-prison institutional settings); DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS
& PAROLE, NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF INSTITUTIONS & AGENCIES, MEDICAL SERVICES STANDARDS §
310.211 (1970) and § 310.271 (1968) (at least minimally accepted medical standards); NORTH
DAKOTA STATE PENITENTIARY, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRISONERS No. 4 (right to medi-
cal treatment); SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL §
400.20 (best medical care and treatment under existing circumstances).
Ns See, e.g., ARIZONA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, PROPOSED MANUAL OF MEDICAL CORRECTIONAL
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which a prisoner is to be transferred to another facility to receive
better care,20 and the extent to which a prisoner may be treated by
his personal physician." Yet, on the whole, the coverage of such
regulations is scanty. Despite the existence of appropriate statutory
authority, state-wide regulations have not been promulgated at all
in a few states, and thus each prison facility is free to establish its
own standards.22 More significantly, the regulations that have been
promulgated apparently apply only to state prisons, with local jails
left free to establish their own regulations.
In addition to the problems of imprecise language and incom-
plete coverage, the state regulatory schemes leave certain other
questions unanswered. First, the statutes are generally silent on the
issue of enforcement: it is unclear whether a prisoner may sue to
compel compliance with the statutes or regulations, or whether his
sole right of action is a common law tort action. If, as has been
suggested, 23 the statutes are simply codifications of common law
principles, then their purpose would be to clarify the relevant stan-
dard of care in a tort action, rather than to create a novel right of
action.
Second, the implications of the general statutes insofar as the
drug-dependent prisoner seeking short-term methadone detoxifica-
tion is concerned are unclear. Most statutes do not mention either
addiction or withdrawal specifically and, although the available
evidence is scanty, it is doubtful that a state court would infer a
STANDS. IT 9, 10; CONN. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS §§ 22 (1), 25 (1974); GEORGIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, RULES AND REGS. §§ 125-2-9-
.02, 125-2-9-.03, 125-2-9.04 (1974); CORRECTIONS DIVISION HAWAII DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES &
HOUSING, HEALTH & MEDICAL SERVICES IN THE CORRECTIONs DIVISION (1972); ILLINOIS DEP'T OF
CORRECTIONS, AD. REG. § 836; DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS & PAROLE, NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF
INSTITUTIONS & AGENCIES, MEDICAL SERVICES STANDARDS § 310.223 (1968); BUREAU OF CORREC-
TIONS, PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE MEDICAL PROTOCOL, AD. DIRECTIVE No. BC-ADM 820;
SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 400.20(2)(g).
20 See, e.g., ARIZONA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, PROPOSED MANUAL OF MEDICAL CORRECTIONAL
STANDARDS 15, 24; CONN. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS § 22(2) (1974); ILLINOIS DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, AD. REG. § 821; WYOMING PRISON
REG. No. E(1); cf. DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHABILITATION
SERVICES, CONTRACTUAL TERMS GOVERNING TRANSFER OF INMATES FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.
"1 See, e.g., ILLINOIS DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, AD. REG. §§ 836, 862 (treatment may be
prescribed only by the prison physician; no absolute right to treatment prescribed by private
physician); SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICIES & PROCEDURES MANUAL § 400.20;
cf. DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS & PAROLE, NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF INSTITUTIONS & AGENCIES, MEDI-
CAL SERVICES STANDARDS § 310.277 (1971) (treatment may be prescribed only by prison physi-
cian, with exception of first aid).
22 Oregon (letter of E. W. Heidenreich, Exec. Ass't, Corrections Division, Dep't of
Human Resources, March 4, 1975); Wisconsin (letter of R. McCauley, Acting Administrator,
Division of Corrections, Dep't of Health & Social Services, Feb. 12, 1975).
n Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 194 (5th Cir. 1971).
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right to methadone from the general statutory right to medical care.
In one of the few cases on this point, a California court construed a
statute requiring prison authorities to provide "aid as necessary to
ease any symptoms of withdrawal"24 as entitling the prisoner only
to valium, a tranquilizer, instead of methadone, even though meth-
adone detoxification is the more effective treatment. 5
Like California, a handful of states have enacted legislation
expressly mandating special treatment for the drug-dependent pris-
oner. Washington, for example, requires that habitual narcotics
users-and, by implication, methadone-maintained prisoners-be
treated until cured."6 The statute does not specifically indicate,
however, what treatment is to be provided. Maryland and Pennsyl-
vania have recently enacted legislation that expressly makes detoxi-
fication mandatory in all state prisons and jails.27 Although the
Pennsylvania statute does not specify the method of detoxification
to be used, the Maryland statute requires that methadone be the
prescribed treatment, a requirement that may prove unfortunate if
a more effective treatment is discovered.
In sum, while the state statutes and regulations provide the
prisoner with a significant degree of protection, on the whole they
are plagued with several deficiences. The standards of care they
purport to establish are vague and the mode of private enforcement
of those standards is ambiguous. Perhaps more important, however,
is the inadequancy of the coverage and often of the medical care
itself under these provisions: local prisons and jails are generally not
regulated at all and, even where state regulations do apply, the
quality and type of medical treatment mandated may vary signifi-
cantly from state to state. Thus, to ensure satisfaction of their medi-
cal needs, prisoners may have to look beyond the state statutes to
24 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11222 (West Supp. 1974).
21 In re Robert Freeman, No. HC 1537 (San Diego Super. Ct. 1970), discussed in Goldin,
Methadone Detoxification, A Non-Controversial Solution to In-Custody Narcotic With-
drawal, 47 CAL. B.J. 14 (1972). At the time of the Freeman case, the provisions of section
11222 of the CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE were contained in section 11396. See text and notes
at notes 96-103 infra.
21 WASH. REv. CODE § 69.32.090 (1962):
• .. [A]ny person who shall be confined or imprisoned in any state, county, or city
prison in the state and who may be reasonably suspected by the health officer of being
a narcotic addict shall be examined for and if found to be an habitual user of said drug
or any of them, shall be treated therefor at public expense . . ..
Coerced medical treatment may raise difficult constitutional issues. See generally, Opton,
Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy Is Punishment?, 45 Miss. L. REv. 605
(1974); THE EMERGING RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 153-54.
2' MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700F (Supp. 1974); Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act §
6(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.106 (Supp. 1974).
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constitutionally based guarantees.
2. Federal Statutes. Several federal statutes concern the right
of prisoners to medical care. Under section 4042 of title 18 of the
United States Code, the Bureau of Prisons is required to "provide
suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence" of all
federal prisoners.2 Section 4042 does not, however, create a private
cause of action in favor of a person who suffers damage due to a
failure of the Bureau or its officers or employees to carry out the
commands of the statute.29 Thus, the federal prisoner must rely on
the deprivation of another statutory, common law, or constitutional
right as a basis of relief.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act,3" a federal prisoner is enti-
tled to sue the United States Government to remedy injuries caused
by the negligence of a government employee.3 There are, however,
major qualifications on the government's liability: it is not liable for
an act or omission of a government employee "in execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid"; nor is it liable for the "exercise or performance or failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function" by an agent "whether
or not the discretion involved be abused" ;32 nor is it generally liable
for the intentional torts of its employees. 3
The Federal Tort Claims Act protects the prisoner's right to
medical care to the extent that it permits compensation for the
negligent acts of federal government employees. Therefore, it would
not create a right to methadone detoxification unless that treatment
were to become so well established that the failure to prescribe it
would constitute medical malpractice. Yet, even then, as long as the
decision to withhold methadone treatment was a deliberate one, the
prisoner might not have an actionable claim because of the inten-
tional tort exception.
Beyond these general provisions, the federal prisoner may look
18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970).
Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987, 992 (S.D. Ark. 1972). Although a suit to
remedy a breach of section 4042 may be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the scope
of the duty imposed in fact upon the prison system is unclear. Williams v. United States,
405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1970).
3! United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). A prisoner will prevail when a "private
individual under like circumstances would be liable under state law." Id. at 153. The immun-
ity from suit which some states extend to those in charge of prisoners does not extend to
authorities in federal prisons, since 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970) establishes the duty of care owed
by the government. Id. at 164-65.
32 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). But see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08,
at 471 (1958).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
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to the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act,34 which grants federal
courts discretionary authority to suspend the prosecution of a per-
son charged with an offense against the United States in order to
determine if the defendant is a narcotics addict.35 If the court finds
that the defendant is an addict and that he is a likely candidate for
rehabilitation, it may order him civilly committed for up to thirty-
six months of treatment. Upon successful completion of the treat-
ment, the charges must be dropped. The Act provides a similar
program of long-term therapeutic civil commitment for addicts who
are convicted prisoners as well.3"
Despite its rehabilitative purpose, the Narcotics Addict
Rehabilitation Act provides the drug-dependent federal prisoner
with only limited protection. The Act grants broad discretionary
powers to the courts to determine whether a given defendant or
convict is suitable for rehabilitation; an addict who is deemed un-
suitable for rehabilitation will be automatically excluded from spe-
cial programs. While the Bureau of Prisons has enlarged by regula-
tion the number of addicts eligible for special treatment, 3 it has also
substantially curtailed the potential effectiveness of those programs
by restricting the use of methadone, permitted by a 1972 amend-
ment to the Act, 8 to participants outside the prison confines. 9
Thus, while an imprisoned addict may be eligible for treatment
based on the nature and history of his drug dependence, he will not
be entitled to the methadone detoxification he may desperately
need.
IX. THE PRISONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO MEDICAL CARE
In addition to the rights conferred by the common law, statutes,
and regulations, a prisoner has a constitutional right to needed med-
ical treatment. Imprisonment is the punishment for crime; when
deprivation of needed medical care is added to the imprisonment,
the additional suffering it causes constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
" Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act § 101, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1970).
Defendants charged with certain crimes, such as crimes of violence or drug trafficking,
are ineligible to participate in the program. 18 U.S.C. § 2901(g) (1970).
u Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4151-55 (1970).
31 BUREAU OF PRISONS POLICY STATEMENT § 8542 (1973).
38 Pub. L. No. 92-420, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2901(d), 18 id. § 4251(c), and 42 id. §
3411(b): "I eatment' . . . includes. . . rehabilitative services designed to protect the pub-
lic and benefit the addict by eliminating his dependence on addicting drugs, or by controlling
his dependence, and his susceptibility to addiction." This amendment, by expanding the
definition of "treatment" to include "control of dependence" in addition to "elimination of
dependence," permits methadone use as an additional mode of treatment. S. REP. No. 92-
1071, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
11 BUREAU OF PRISONS POLICY STATEMENT § 8651 (1973).
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ishment in excess of that imposed by the sentencing court." Thus,
the intentional denial of needed treatment violates the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment," or, if the
prisoner is in a state or local jail or prison, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment." While this principle is easily stated,
the standard of medical care that it imposes is not. Currently, there
appear to be two judicial' interpretations of that standard-one
widely accepted and the other, which provides the prisoner with
more substantial protection, perhaps receiving increased accept-
ance.43
A. The Majority Standard
Under the majority standard, the prisoner's right to medical
treatment is violated only when needed treatment is intentionally
withheld by prison officials.44 Treatment prescribed or administered
with a "callous disregard" for the prisoner's welfare or treatment
that is "grossly negligent" is also impermissible because it is consid-
ered to be the equivalent of an intentional deprivation of needed
care.45 There is, however, a broad de minimis qualification to the
majority standard: an intentional deprivation is cruel and unusual
only when it is extraordinary, shocking, or barbaric." Under this
standard, a prisoner is entitled to "some," but not the best, care,
and negligent care is not actionable because it is considered the
inevitable consequence of attending to the prisoner's medical needs
at all.47
1o Ramsay v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (addendum).
Id.
42 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
i Prisoners claiming damages for a breach of the duty to provide medical care generally
bring an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). A prisoner claiming to be aggrieved by
a current or continuing violation is likely to file a petition of habeas corpus. Suits for injunc-
tive relief are rarely brought under these circumstances because of the relatively detailed and
lengthy procedures involved. Ramsay v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605-06 (W. D. Mo. 1970)
(addendum).
" Coleman v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957).
s Pinon v. Wisconsin, 368 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Ramsay v. Ciccone, 310 F.
Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
4, See, e.g., Startz v. Cullen, 468 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1972); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970,
972 (8th Cir. 1965). Lesser mistreatment, while not condoned, is not a constitutional viola-
tion. Cf. Cummins v. Ciccone, 317 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Mo. 1970); State ex rel. Kopetka v.
Young, 282 Minn. 529, 163 N.W.2d 49 (1968).
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), there were intimations in the various concurr-
ences that punishment that does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate penological
purpose, and was therefore unnecessary, should be held to violate the eighth amendment. See
also Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 MIcH. L. REV.
1161, 1163 (1972) (citing authorities).
11 Ramsay v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605 (W.D. Mo. (1970) (addendum).
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Application of the majority standard may often produce harsh
results. A prison may use inferior medical procedures so long as they
are not "shockingly" inferior,48 and the "most rudimentary" prison
facilities are also permissible. 9 Nevertheless, the majority standard
does provide constitutional protection in certain limited circum-
stances: denying a prisoner access to the prison physician breaches
the duty to provide care, as does the withholding of any prescribed
treatment.
50
Although the majority formulation of the prisoner's right to
medical care is restrictive, it is not without a reasoned basis. Courts
are generally unwilling to presume that prison officials treat their
prisoners with intentional cruelty and are therefore unwilling to
undertake the difficult task of reviewing medical decisions absent
an independent demonstration of bad faith." Further, the courts do
not wish to become arbiters of patient-physician disputes, many of
which may be frivolous.2 But, while this approach may be logical
in view of a court's limited resources, it must be recognized that its
major effect is to entrust the prisoner's constitutional right to medi-
cal care to the nearly unreviewable discretion of one or a few per-
sons."
Is In re Robert Freeman, No. HC 1537 (San Diego Super. Ct. 1970), discussed in Goldin,
supra note 25.
1, Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
5 Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970) (barring access of inmate to the prison
druggist and thus to prescribed medication stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th
Cir. 1974); Black v. Ciccone, 324 F. Supp. 129 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (requiring prisoner to work
against physician's orders held to be unconstitutional). In Beckett v. Kearney, 247 F. Supp.
219 (N.D. Ga. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1966), allegations by a prisoner that he had
been forced to do heavy work even though he had a prescription for a light work assignment
were held to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; the question was mooted,
however, when the officials reassigned the prisoner to light work. But see Carlisle v. Scott,
357 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (failure to provide prescribed diet held constitutionally
permissible). See generally THE EMERGING RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 149.
5, See, e.g., Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1973); Oakes v. Wainwright, 430
F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1970); Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1970); Carswell v. Wain-
wright, 418 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1969); Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1970);
cf. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3053
(U.S. July 9, 1975) (No. 75-44). "[Wlhen a prison guard acts in reliance on a good faith belief
that what he is doing is constitutionally permissible, he is immune to damages as a conse-
quence of his action even if it should be later established that his belief was ill-founded." Id.
at 370.
52 Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Hyde v. Mc-
Ginnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970); McKinney v. California, 427 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1970);
Chapman v. Gilligan, 2 Ph. L. RPrR. 420 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Davis v. Schmidt, 57 F.R.D. 37
(W.D. Wis. 1972).
53 It has been suggested that the discretion problem could be eliminated by court-
appointed medical review boards of doctors. It has also been suggested that prisoners should
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B. The Minority Standard
In Blanks v. Cunningham,54 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit apparently departed from the majority standard, substitut-
ing a right to "reasonable" medical care for the majority's right to
"some" care. Although this standard has not yet been adopted by
any other circuit, at least one district court outside the Fourth Cir-
cuit has employed the "reasonableness" language. 5
The most difficult question posed by the reasonableness stan-
dard is the definition of "reasonable," since courts that use the term
rarely define it. In Ricketts v. Ciccone,56 a district court outside the
Fourth Circuit used a broad definition, stating that "prisons are
legally obligated to provide available medical treatment of a type
approved by recognized medical authority. ' 57 But in Blakely v.
Sheriff of A lbemarle County,5" a district court in the Fourth Circuit
applied a more limited definition. The court reaffirmed the princi-
ple that a prisoner is entitled to reasonable medical care, but enig-
matically added that mistreatment must "shock the conscience" in
order to reach constitutional dimensions. 9 The court's apparent re-
treat to the majority position was perhaps an indication of its un-
willingness to act as a medical review board.
Although it is impossible to predict which definition of "reason-
able" will ultimately prevail, any expression of the minority stan-
dard should entitle prisoners to more than "some" medical care.
More significantly, the yardstick for measuring unconstitutional
medical care under the minority standard should be, not the culpa-
bility of prison officials, but rather the more objective criterion of
be permitted to be examined by privately retained physicians. Implementation of this pro-
posal, however, might create prison disruptions and be prone to equal protection challenge.
See, THE EMERGING RIrHTs, supra note 5, at 150.
5, 409 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th
Cir. 1966). The origin of the right to reasonable medical care is unclear. Blanks, the first case
expressly to refer to that right, cites Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institute, 351 F.2d 613 (4th
Cir. 1965), as authority for the proposition that there is such a right. Nothing in Hirons
supports this assertion, a fact which may suggest that the Fourth Circuit was not announcing
a new standard, but was using new language to explain the old standard. A careful reading
of Blanks, however, dispels this doubt. The plaintiff in Blanks alleged that the prison guards
had forcibly prevented him from receiving treatment for his epileptic condition. If true, the
allegations would have been clearly actionable under the majority standard as an intentional
deprivation of treatment. The fact that the court chose to announce the standard of "reasona-
bleness" in such an easy case suggests that it was conciously breaking new ground.
s Ricketts v. Ciccone, 371 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
, 317 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
57 Id. at 1256.
370 F. Supp. 814 (W.D. Va. 1974).
5' Id. at 816.
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the medical needs of the prisoner. Nevertheless, the right to receive
reasonable care cannot be made absolute: the right to immediate
care must be qualified both by the seriousness of the prisoner's need
and by the burden that providing such care would place on the
prison system."0
Finally, it must be noted that the vitality of the majority stan-
dard has not been seriously eroded by the evolution of a reasonable-
ness standard. The majority standard has been applied in numerous
recent cases,61 while the minority standard has rarely been applied
outside the Fourth Circuit.12 The majority standard has thus re-
mained the prevalent one, although other circuits may, under the
notion of "evolving standards of decency, '6 3 eventually adopt the
minority position.
C. Toward a Proposed Standard of Care
Although the minority standard of reasonable medical care has
gained only a foothold in the law, the principle it represents is
neither inappropriate nor is its use impracticable. Once it is recog-
nized that a prisoner has a right to medical treatment, it is difficult
to justify depriving that right of its essential meaning. The restric-
tive majority standard of care is not only inconsistent with the de-
velopment of other constitutional guarantees, but is inherently il-
logical as well.
0 Mills v. Oliver, 367 F. Supp. 77, 79 (E.D. Va. 1973).
" See, e.g., Startz v. Cullen, 468 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1972); Nettles v. Rundle, 453 F.2d
889 (3d Cir. 1971); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970); White v. Sullivan, 368
F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Ala. 1973); Carlisle v. Scott, 357 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. ll. 1973); Black v.
Ciccone, 324 F. Supp. 129 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Ramsay v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo.
1970).
42 See, e.g., Ricketts v. Ciccone, 371 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
Gamble v. Estelle, No. 74-3727 (5th Cir., filed Aug. 4, 1975), might be a relevant
example. In Gamble, the appellant had alleged that he had severely wrenched his back while
working in prison but had never been permitted to have his injury examined by the prison
physician. He further alleged that he was merely given a mild and ineffective pain pill and
that he had been kept in solitary confinement for most of the months immediately subsequent
to his injury. The Fifth Circuit held that the appellant had stated a valid cause of action
entitling him to relief upon proper proof. Although the court could have easily reached this
result under the majority standard by concluding that there had been a total deprivation of
care alleged, the court expressly eschewed reliance on the majority standard cases, finding
them not controlling. The court did not go so far as to adopt the minority "reasonableness"
standard, but rather seemed to stake out some sort of middle ground, perhaps in line with
its "standard of decency":
Moreover where the general medical services afforded by the State in its prisons are
publicly known to be "woefully inadequate," the court must exercise the highest degree
of care to make certain that a prisoner is not deprived of his federally secured right to
medical care.
Cf. Smith v. Schneckloth, 414 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1969).
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The majority standard is illogical because it reads the eighth
amendment to protect a right without substance: "some" care is
often little better than no care. Moreover, the majority standard is
a subjective one-a deprivation of treatment being a constitutional
violation only if it is intentional or functionally equivalent to inten-
tional-that often generates inconsistent results. For example, a
constitutional violation is established when prison officials know of
the prisoner's condition and ignore it; but if the same officials con-
sider the same prisoner's case and erroneously conclude that no
treatment is appropriate, then their behavior is constitutionally
immune. 4 Finally, even intentional deprivations must somehow be
"shocking" to be constitutionally impermissible. The courts' appar-
ent unwillingness to encourage frivolous claims and their reluctance
to review the merits of medical decisions provide no logical justifica-
tion for reading such an empty right into the eighth amendment.
In interpreting other constitutional guarantees, the courts have
apparently not felt a similar need to harness the development of
meaningful protections. For example, under the traditional view of
the sixth amendment, a claim of violation of the right to counsel was
actionable only if counsel's efforts were either nonexistent or so
perfunctory as to render the proceeding a "farce and a mockery of
justice. '6 5 The courts have recently abandoned this standard in
favor of a malpractice or reasonableness standard, requiring that
counsel's performance be of at least minimal competence." In de-
ciding that the sixth amendment mandates effective counsel, the
courts were aware that the right to counsel was of no real protective
value if it could be satisfied by formal compliance. 7
11 United States ex rel. Ingram v. Montgomery Cty. Prison Bd., 369 F. Supp. 873, 874
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
11 See, e.g., Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
916 (1967); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); Nutt v. United States, 335
F.2d 817, 818 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); United States ex rel. Cooper v.
Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 613 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); Frand v. United States,
301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th Cir. 1962). See generally Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1973).
" Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266, 268 (1973); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125,
127-28 (5th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970); Kott v.
Green, 303 F. Supp. 821, 822 (N.D. Ohio 1968); New Jersey v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507,
519, 285 A.2d 234, 240 (App. Div. 1971). See generally Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense
Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
289, 293 (1964).
" Id. It can be argued that the analogy between the rights to effective medical care and
to effective counsel is weak because the latter is based on an express constitutional right,
whereas the former is derivative. Nevertheless, the analogy may still be persuasive to the
extent that it indicates the courts' willingness to protect a constitutional right by establishing
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Since the right to medical care is empty without an assurance
of adequacy, the lesson of sixth amendment development should be
applied to give content to the constitutional right to medical care.
Moreover, importing an adequacy standard into the right to medical
care would not require a court to review medical decisions; rather
than second-guessing the physician's choice of treatment, the court
would simply ask whether the treatment prescribed and provided
was medically indicated under the circumstances. The courts would
not defer to the prison doctor's assertion that he had provided
"some" treatment, but would defer to a showing that a private
physician might reasonably have prescribed the same treatment.
The adequacy of care standard also comports with the eighth
amendment principle underlying the right to in-prison medical
care, that the punishment imposed on the prisoner should not be
increased by personal medical problems. If a physician prescribes
or renders "some" treatment for a prisoner, but some other treat-
ment would normally have been prescribed or provided as a matter
of course by a privately retained physician, then, assuming the dis-
parity in treatment was not inconsequential, it is difficult to resist
the inference that the maltreatment was due solely to the patient's
status as a prisoner and hence presumptively unconstitutional. If,
on the other hand, the treatment prescribed or administered might
well have been dispensed to a non-prisoner patient, it cannot be
viewed as punishment.
The right to medical care under the proposed standard, as
under the "reasonableness" standard,"8 cannot be unnecessarily
qualified. It would first be necessary to determine whether the pris-
oner had received generally accepted medical treatment and, if not,
whether the deprivation was not inconsequential. If the prisoner did
not receive adequate care, a prima facie case of constitutional
violation would be established which the government could attempt
to rebut by arguing that legitimate government interests, such as
prison security, justified withholding the care. On a showing of inad-
equate and hence impermissible treatment, the prisoner would be
entitled to daniages69 or injunctive relief, absent a showing of a
legitimate countervailing government interest.
a standard that requires more than formal compliance. Cf. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 95 S. Ct.
2486 (1975) (concerning the rights of civilly commited mental patients to therapeutic treat-
ment).
See text and note at note 60 supra.
6' Various cases stated that a prisoner may receive money damages for a breach of his
constitutional right to medical care. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600, 605
(W.D. Mo. 1970) (addendum). Yet it is difficult to surmise how these damages are to be
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D. The Right to Rehabilitative Treatment
Once a right to receive remedial medical treatment is estab-
lished, there is likely to be an attempt to extend the scope of that
right to guarantee the prisoner affirmative, long-term rehabilitative
medical treatment. Because the leading cases establishing a right
to rehabilitative treatment have involved incarcerated juveniles0
and involuntarily committed mental patients,71 the argument that
there is a comparable right for the prisoner is likely to proceed by
analogy.
Where the right to rehabilitative treatment is recognized, it
derives from fundamental notions of due process: simply put, when
a person is committed to an institution for the express purpose of
rehabilitation, he is entitled to treatment designed for his rehabili-
tation.72 A person confined solely for the purpose of rehabilitation
is deprived of his liberty without due process of law if he does not
receive rehabilitative treatment. Indeed, some courts have referred
to rehabilitation as the quid pro quo that the government owes in
return for the individual's loss of liberty.73 This principle may, how-
ever, have been weakened by the Supreme Court's recent rejection,
in Donaldson v. O'Connor,74 of the Court of Appeals' reliance on
such a broadly based constitutional right and Chief Justice Burger's
explicit rejection of the "quid pro quo" rationale in a concurring
opinion .75
Whatever the right to social rehabilitation of juvenile delin-
quents or mental patients under the due process rationale, it is clear
that, at least at the present time, prisoners have no analogous right.
When a convicted criminal is sentenced to jail or prison, his incar-
ceration serves the purposes of punishment, specific and general
deterrence, and isolation from the community, as well as rehabilita-
tion.76 Thus the courts have sanctioned prison systems lacking reha-
computed. Although tort standards probably would not be used because the courts view the
tort and constitutional actions as distinct, it is unclear what standard should be used instead.
7, See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358-59 (7th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Turman,
364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
'1 Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974) (civilly committed mentally re-
tarded have a right to treatment); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(right to treatment for patients civilly committed involuntarily); cf. Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd on different grounds, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
72 See id. and note 70 supra.
7 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 524 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd on different grounds,
95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
7, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
" Id. at 2499.
'S Cf. Zimring, Current Aspects of Penology: Threat of Punishment as an Instrument of
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bilitative programs and facilities.7 7
While prisoners currently have no right to social rehabilitation,
they may have a right to long-term medical rehabilitation. In the
case of treatment for narcotics addiction, however, medical treat-
ment, which may be constitutionally required, and vocational-
psychological therapy, which is not so required, logically coalesce.78
It is difficult to locate the point at which treatment is no longer
designed to combat the psychological roots of the disease, but rather
is intended to rehabilitate. Therefore, given that prisoners are con-
stitutionally entitled to medical care and that one of the avowed
purposes of penal incarceration is rehabilitation, a combination of
logic and societal interests in decency and "curing" the root cause
of individual criminality may force a general re-examination of the
rehabilitation doctrine in the prison context and a specific recogni-
tion of a right to long-term medical rehabilitation.
III. THE DISEASE OF ADDICTION AND ITS VARIOUS CURES
A. The Disease of Addiction
The command of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment is at once positive and negative. The amend-
ment not only prohibits the infliction of inhumane treatment upon
prisoners, but also requires attention to the medical needs of prison-
ers because a failure to treat may itself constitute inhumane treat-
ment. Forcing a prisoner to withdraw from a dependency on narcotic
drugs without benefit of detoxificants could be viewed as a violation
of either the positive or negative commands of the eighth amend-
ment: the pain caused by abrupt withdrawal could be viewed as
inhumane treatment in itself, or the "treatment" by way of abrupt
withdrawal could be viewed as a breach of the duty to provide
medical care. The latter possibility will form the focus of the re-
mainder of this comment.
Crime Control, 118 PROC. Am. PHIL. Soc. 231 (June 1974); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889,
891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing
Decisions, A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1455 (1960). But see Morris, The
Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 MicH. L. RFv. 1161 (1974), argu-
ing that rehabilitation is not and should not be the purpose of imprisonment.
7 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Wilson v. Kelley,
294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012-13 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
," United States v. Fitzgerald, 466 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Fitzgerald the court
dismissed as unwarranted on the record a claim that rehabilitation was unconstitutionally
denied, but noted that federal prisoners can receive care and treatment for narcotics addic-
tion "just as they can for any other personal affliction" under 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970). 466
F.2d at 380.
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In Robinson v. California,79 the issue before the Court was
whether criminally punishing a person simply for being an addict
violated the eighth amendment. The Court quoted with approval its
language from Linder v. United States that addicts "are diseased
and proper subjects for [medical] treatment, 8 ° and held that the
status of being diseased could not form the predicate for criminal
liability. Although the Court eased its path to this conclusion by
noting that addiction may be involuntarily induced,8' this language
limited neither the scope of the precise holding nor the definition
of a "disease" for eighth amendment purposes to illnesses that are
not voluntarily contracted. The Court observed that the status of
having venereal disease, which is ordinarily contracted through a
voluntary act, also could not form the predicate for criminal liabil-
ity.82
Treatment of the symptoms of addiction is not constitutionally
mandated simply because addiction may properly be labelled a
"disease." But when a prison official chooses to eliminate one of the
aspects of addiction-physiological dependence on the drug-by
denying the prisoner access to the drug, the official has, in effect,
chosen to attempt to cure one of the prisoner's symptoms. The
"cure" by an abrupt, "cold turkey" withdrawal has painful collat-
eral effects,83 although it is rarely fatal. 4 If, as will be argued
below,M there is an effective means of treating physiological de-
pendence other than by abrupt withdrawal-such as methadone
detoxification-without the same painful effects or other medical
complications, it would be difficult to discern any reason other than
retribution for denying a drug-dependent prisoner such treatment.
The magnitude of this problem should not be minimized. It has
been estimated that there were between 250,000 and 559,000 narcot-
ics addicts in the United States in 1971.88 It has also been estimated
7' 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Id. at 667 n.8.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 666-67.
Symptoms include running of the eyes and nose, difficulty in swallowing, severe
gastro-intestinal cramps, diarrhea, frequent vomiting, loss of appetite, dehydration, general-
ized muscle cramps, copious sweating, hot and cold flashes and chills, increased blood pres-
sure, and insomnia. AMA Council on Mental Health, Treatment of Morphine-Type Depend-
ence by Withdrawal Methods, 219 J.A.M.A. 1611-12 (1972); Wenk, Methadone Detoxification
in Prison: A Case Study in Philadelphia, in DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADDICT 209, 211-14 (L.
Simmons & M. Gold eds. 1974).
s' Letter from E. Senay, M. D., Director, Illinois Drug Abuse Program (July 29, 1974).
See text and notes at notes 94-103 supra.
' R. GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 114.
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that 200,000 addicts spend some time in jail or prison annually. 7
Although these figures are at best rough approximations, they indi-
cate that there are a substantial number of addicts in this country
who may have to face the prospect of being "cured" of their physiol-
ogical dependence by forced abrupt withdrawal in prison or jail."
B. Methadone: The Medically Indicated Treatment
Methadone, a synthetic narcotic, has recently come into wide-
spread use as a painless, short-term "cure" for physical drug de-
pendence and as a long-term narcotic substitute in supervised pro-
grams." By 1973, approximately 73,000 persons were participating
in regulated 0 long-term methadone maintenance programs9'
throughout the nation,12 while countless others had gone through
curative detoxification programs.
The first step in the typical short-term in-prison methadone
detoxification program is a medical examination at the time of
entry. Detoxification treatment, consisting of a series of gradually
decreasing doses of methadone over a one to three week period is
offered to "hard" drug addicts and to methadone-maintained pris-
oners. The treatment substantially cures the addict of his physiolog-
ical drug dependency without producing the suffering caused by
abrupt withdrawal. 3
There is virtual unanimity among physicians and students of
the criminal justice system that abrupt withdrawal is an improper
means of "curing" drug addiction. Although it will substantially
eliminate physiological drug dependency, abrupt withdrawal has no
other therapeutic value. 4 Since detoxification can also substantially
Id. at 119.
In mid-1972 between 10 and 25 percent of the nation's local and county jails had
addiction treatment programs. Only a few of these programs involved methadone detoxifica-
tion. CRIMINAL JUSnCE INFORMATION & STATISTICAL SERVICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF INMATES IN LOCAL JAILS (1974) (1972 Ad-
vance Report estimating that 25 percent of jails have drug treatment programs); R. GOLDFARB,
supra note 1, at 86 (estimating that 9.1 percent of jails have treatment facilities).
" See generally Dole, Detoxification of Sick Addicts in Prisons, 220 J.A.M.A. 366 (1972).
" All methadone use is regulated; 21 C.F.R. § 310.505 (1974). See also 21 C.F.R. § 3.77
(1974).
1, For a discussion of the components of a long-term methadone maintenance program,
see AMA Council on Mental Health, Oral Methadone Maintenance Techniques in the Man-
agement of Morphine-Type Dependency, 219 J.A.M.A. 1618 (Mar. 20, 1972).
2 Epstein, Methadone, The Forlorn Hope, 36 THE PUB. INTEREST 3 (1974).
93 Dole, Detoxification of Sick Addicts in Prisons, 220 J.A.M.A. 366 (1972). See also
R. GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 140-42. There is considerable variety in existing methadone
detoxification programs in municipal jails. Id. at 144-46.
11 See, e.g., Jaffe, Zaks, & Washington, Experience with the Use of Methadone in a
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eliminate the physical dependency without producing the harsh ef-
fects of abrupt withdrawal or other side effects, the failure to pro-
vide a detoxificant would seem unjustifiable.95
Methadone, moreover, is generally considered to be the most
effective detoxificant. 90 For example, Dr. Edward Senay, Director of
the Illinois Drug Abuse Program, concludes that ". . . because of
its long duration of action and because of its effectiveness when
given orally . . . the substitution of methadone is universally rec-
ommended and practiced."97 The United States Public Health Serv-
ice considers methadone to be the most satisfactory method of "cur-
ing" physiological drug dependence.98 The American Medical Asso-
ciation also concludes that abrupt withdrawal is "inhuman, unnec-
essary, and distinctly contraindicated, even if the patient is in
jail."99
Although valium and other tranquilizers are occasionally used
to temper the harshness of abrupt withdrawal, such treatment is
widely regarded as inadequate and ineffective.'0 0 Tranquilizers, like
abrupt withdrawal, lack independent therapeutic value'"' and
merely blur, to a certain extent, the patient's perception of the
painful side effects of the withdrawal. While tranquilizers are con-
sidered minimally effective in cases of light drug habits,0 2 there is
Multi-Modality Program for the Treatment of Narcotic Users, 4 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 481, 487
(1969).
"5 In fact, the prognosis for completely eliminating physiological drug dependency after
one treatment-whether it be by abrupt withdrawal or by methadone detoxification -is poor
except for an emotionally normal individual medically addicted in the course of treatment
for painful injury or illness. The normal recidivism rate is high. 7 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND
SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 538, 539 (P. Cantor ed. 1962). There are, however, many other
diseases, such as malaria, that also require prolonged treatment.
", AMA Council on Mental Health, Narcotics and Medical Practice, 202 J.A.M.A. 209,
211 (1967); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 149; Statement of N. Zinberg, M.D., Associate
Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, March 7, 1975, on file at The University of
Chicago Law Review.
11 Statement of E. Senay, M.D., Director, Illinois Drug Abuse Program, Illinois Dep't of
Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, March 13, 1975, on file at The University of
Chicago Law Review.
"1 NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR DRUG ABUSE INFORMATION: METHADONE: THE DRUG AND ITS
THERAPEUTIC USES IN THE TREATMENT OF ADDICTION 7 (1974).
"1 AMA COUNCIL ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 83, at 1611. See also AMA Committee
on Alcoholism and Drug Dependency, Narcotics and Medical Practice, 218 J.A.M.A. 578
(1971).
I" Statement of J. Jackman, M.D., Director, Lanakila Mental Health Clinic, Kalihi
Palama Community Mental Health Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 6, 1975, on file at The
University of Chicago Law Review; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 1, at 136. But see id. at 148-49.
" ' Statement of N. Zinberg, supra note 96; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 1 at 136.
102 Cf. In re Robert Freeman, No. HC 1537 (San Diego Super. Ct., 1970), discussed in
Goldin, supra note 25.
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general agreement that methadone is the only appropriate treat-
ment in all other cases."0 3
Methadone is not only used as a short-term treatment to cure
physiological dependency but is also used in long-term mainte-
nance programs, as a narcotics surrogate in conjunction with
rehabilitative services. Unlike the use of methadone for detoxifica-
tion, the use of methadone as a long-term maintenance treatment
has generated considerable controversy, both in the medical profes-
sion and in the society at large.
The proponents of long-term use assert that methadone-
maintained persons are less likely to engage in criminal and other
anti-social behavior,0 4 are more likely to be employable,' 5 and are
more likely to reach and maintain a drug-free status'' than are
ordinary heroin addicts. Critics of maintenance, on the other hand,
observe that maintained patients are still drug-dependent and thus
have not achieved abstinence-the "only legitimate objective" of a
drug treatment program. 0 Critics have also asserted that the pa-
tients used in pilot maintenance programs did not represent an
unbiased sample of drug addicts'08 or that maintenance programs
are a covert means of "enslaving" members of racial minorities.''
"1 Jackson v. Hendrick, No. 71-2447 (Ct. C.P., Philadelphia, 1972), discussed in Wenk,
Methadone Detoxification in Prison: A Case Study in Philadelphia, in DISCRIMINATION AND
THE ADDICT 209 (L. Simmons & M. Gold eds. 1974); Jaffe, Washington & Zaks, Experience
with the Use of Methadone in a Multi-Modality Program for the Treatment of Narcotic Users,
4 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 481, 486 (1969).
" NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION & STATISTICS SERVICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT AssIs-
TANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEROIN USE AND CRIME IN A METHADONE MAIN-
TENANCE PROGRAM (1973); Cushman, Methadone Maintenance Treatment of Narcotic
Addiction, 72 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 1752 (1972); DuPont & Katon, Development of a Heroin-
Addiction Treatment Program: Effect on Urban Crime, 216 J.A.M.A. 1320 (1971); Jaffe,
Washington & Zaks, Experience with the Use of Methadone in a Multi-Modality Program
for the Treatment of Narcotic Users, 4 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 481 (1969); Senay, Jaffe, Chappel
& Renault, Illinois Drug Abuse Program-Five Year Results, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH
ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON METHADONE TREATMENT 1437 (1973).
105 Jaffe, Washington & Zaks, Experience with the Use of Methadone in a Multi-
Modality Program for the Treatment of Narcotic Users, 4 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 481, 486 (1969);
Senay, Jaffe, Chappel, & Renault, Illinois Drug Abuse Program-Five Year Results, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON METHADONE TREATIENT 1437
(1973).
I Senay & Renault, Treatment Methods for Heroin Addicts: A Review, 3 J. PSYCH.
DRUGS 47 (1971).
"I NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR DRUG ABUSE INFORMATION, METHADONE: THE DRUG AND ITS
THERAPEUTIC USES IN THE TREATMENT OF ADDICTION 13 (1974) (quoting Expert Committee on
Drug Dependence, World Health Organiz.ation).
"I AMA Methadone Maintenance Evaluation Committee, Progress Report of Evaluation
of Methadone Maintenance Treatment, 206 J.A.M.A. 2712 (1968); Epstein, supra note 92.
I NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR DRUG ABUSE INFORMATION, supra note 107, at 14.
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More importantly, the medical community is as yet unwilling
to give its wholehearted approval to long-term methadone main-
tenance. 10 Although the authorities disagree about whether long-
term maintenance produces harmful side effects, it seems clear that
further study is required before a definitive conclusion may be
reached."'
The controversy over methadone maintenance is only partially
relevant in the present context. When an addict or methadone-
maintained person is incarcerated, the issue that generally arises is
whether he has a right to "curative" short-term detoxification
rather than long-term methadone maintenance. Prisons are only
required by the eighth and fourteenth amendments to provide medi-
cal care to prisoners; they are not obliged to provide rehabilitative
services. In certain cases, however, such as that of the methadone-
maintained pretrial detainee, the right to long-term maintenance
will be important.
Thus, although the appropriateness of long-term methadone
maintenance is the source of medical controversy, short-term detox-
ification through methadone is currently the accepted "cure" for
physiological drug dependency. Whether the Constitution requires
that either form of treatment be made available, where appropriate,
to addicts in jails or prisons is a more difficult question.
IV. THE DRUG-DEPENDENT PRISONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO MEDICAL CARE
Whether a prisoner or pretrial detainee has a constitutional
right to short-term methadone detoxification or comparable treat-
ment is largely dependent on which standard of care is applied. It
is unlikely that prisoners would be held to have such a right under
the majority standard, but the minority standard, especially as ex-
pressed above in the proposed standard, would probably accord a
right to short-term detoxification.
A. The Convicted Prisoner
1. The Majority Standard. Under the majority standard,"2
"I0 Compare NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, METHADONE
TREATMENT MANUAL 19 (1973), with Kreek, Medical Safety & Side Effects of Methadone in
Tolerant Individuals, 223 J.A.M.A. 665 (1973), and Krdek, Physiological Implications of
Methadone Treatment, in PROCEDURES OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON METHA-
DONE TREATMENT (1973).
Senay & Renault, supra note 106.
11 See text and notes at notes 44-53 supra.
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whether it would be unconstitutional to deny methadone detoxifica-
tion or comparable treatment to a drug-dependent prisoner would
depend on the circumstances surrounding the denial. If the prison
official knew of the prisoner's addiction and intentionally failed to
provide any treatment, then the deprivation would be unconstitu-
tional; the violation would occur, however, not because methadone
was denied but because "some" treatment had not been provided.
If, on the other hand, the official considered the prisoner's condition
and decided that abrupt withdrawal was the proper treatment,
then, despite the prisoner's evident need for treatment, there would
be no constitutional violation.13
Thus it appears that a drug-dependent prisoner would not pres-
ently be entitled to short-term methadone detoxification under the
majority standard. It is possible, however, that the courts adopting
the majority standard will eventually recognize a right to short-term
detoxification. As evidence of the medical acceptability of metha-
done becomes even stronger, they may determine that forcing a
prisoner to go through abrupt withdrawal constitutes "no" rather
than "some" treatment, thereby violating the eighth amendment.
Decisions in two local courts indicate that this possibility may not
be wholly unrealistic. In In re Robert Freeman"' and Jackson v.
Hendrick"' the courts suggested that prison officials may be under
a duty to provide detoxification treatment if the treatment other-
wise provided to a drug-dependent prisoner is tantamount to "no"
treatment at all.
Interesting questions arise under the majority standard when
methadone has been prescribed for a drug-dependent prisoner and
for some reason the prisoner is denied access to it. If the prison
physician himself prescribed the treatment, the subsequent depri-
vation by prison authorities would clearly violate the eighth amend-
ment because a prisoner is entitled to the treatment prescribed for
him. If, however, the prisoner is a participant in a registered metha-
done maintenance program when he enters the jail. or prison, a
determination by the prison official or physician that abrupt with-
drawal is the proper cure would not be actionable. In that case,
there would not be an intentional deprivation of treatment for
eighth amendment purposes, but rather a medical decision concern-
ing proper treatment. This decision would be subject to constitu-
"' United States ex rel. Ingram v. Montgomery Cty. Prison Bd., 369 F. Supp. 873, 876-
77 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
"' In re Robert Freeman, No. HC 1537 (San Diego Super. Ct., 1970).
Jackson v. Hendrick, No. 71-2437 (Ct. C.P., Philadelphia, 1972).
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tional scrutiny only if methadone detoxification were such a well-
established and uniformly accepted treatment that the failure to
detoxify gradually could be characterized as a complete deprivation
of treatment that would "shock the conscience."
2. The Minority Standard. Under the proposed formulation of
the minority "reasonable" care standard-that is, the prisoner has
a prima facie right to adequate medical care as determined by
objective medical standards1 1 -the drug-dependent prisoner would
probably have a right to short-term methadone detoxification.
Three factors dictate this result: methadone is the generally ac-
cepted treatment for physical drug dependency; the suffering
caused by abrupt withdrawal, even if tempered by tranquilizers, is
severe; and there is no readily apparent government interest that
would justify withholding the treatment.
First, it has already been shown that short-term methadone
detoxification is the medically indicated method of eliminating
physical drug dependency." 7 The reasoning behind this conclusion
is dual: methadone painlessly eliminates physiological drug de-
pendence without causing adverse side effects, while the painful
"treatment" by way of abrupt withdrawal lacks independent thera-
peutic value. It bears noting, however, that prison officials will not
be permanently locked-in to prescribing methadone under the mi-
nority standard. The development of more effective medically ac-
cepted treatments will terminate the obligation to prescribe metha-
done.
Second, it has been noted that the minority/proposed standard
implicitly incorporates a de minimis exception. For example, com-
mon sense would suggest that a claim that buffered aspirin rather
than ordinary aspirin was the medically indicated treatment should
lack constitutional stature. There is no reason to infer a retributive
intent from the choice of treatments in such a case, nor will the
deprivation be apt to produce sufficient suffering to warrant judicial
intervention. Although it is impossible to draw a clear line between
severe and insignificant medical deprivations, the distinction is
readily apparent in the case of drug addiction: except in the case of
a "light" drug habit, a failure to provide methadone detoxification
or comparable treatment will produce severe suffering. Yet a deter-
mination by the prison physician that a prisoner's habit was too
slight to warrant methadone should be accorded considerable
weight, absent a showing of bad faith.
' See text and notes at notes 64-69 supra.
17 See text and notes at notes 94-103 supra.
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Finally, there is no strong, apparent government interest that
would justify withholding methadone detoxification from drug-
dependent prisoners. The first argument that could be put forth in
an attempt to justify withholding it is that prison security and mor-
ale would be impaired by the presence of the program and the drug
itself in the prison. The significance of the concern with prison
morale is, however, overstated. Although prisoners might be resent-
ful if fellow prisoners were permitted to indulge their drug habits
permanently through long-term methadone maintenance, they
would probably not resent the dispensing of methadone over a short
period to eliminate their fellow prisoners' suffering. Indeed, a policy
of refusing to provide short-term detoxification might have the op-
posite effect, damaging morale and producing additional resent-
ment against the prison and the society that refused to alleviate
such suffering.
Similarly, the concern for prison security is exaggerated. Al-
though there is a possibility that an in-prison detoxification pro-
gram could be abused and thus serve to aggravate rather than mol-
lify the prison drug problem, this possibility is not sufficiently likely
to justify a wholesale policy of compelling abrupt withdrawal for all
drug-dependent prisoners. One court has stated that, on principle,
only those individuals whose behavior demonstrates that they may
not be trusted may be excluded from a prison drug treatment pro-
gram on security grounds. 118 More importantly, actual prison experi-
ence indicates that security problems are not likely to occur"' and
that any problems that do arise are easily combatted by dispensing
the methadone under controlled conditions, such as in the prison
hospital. 1 0
A second possible justification for withholding methadone is
the expense involved in furnishing it. But expense may not always
be an adequate justification for withholding treatment: where the
prisoner has a significant need for treatment and the marginal ex-
pense of the superior treatment is not unreasonably prohibitive, the
prison may be required to provide the better and more expensive
treatment. 121 Although it is difficult to balance necessity and ex-
Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690, 694, 695-96 (N.D. Neb. 1970).
11 See Dole, Detoxification of Sick Addicts in Prisons, 220 J.A.M.A. 366 (1972).
ia Cudnik v. Kreiger, 3 PRI. L. Rrm. 221 (E.D. Ohio 1974).
2 Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303, 1320 (5th Cir. 1974); Pisadano v. New York, 8
App. Div. 2d 335, 188 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1959) (court held in tort action that the moderate expense
of a particular curative treatment generally will not justify giving a less expensive, but
ineffective treatment). See also Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 626-27 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) (court ordered structural changes in prison facility to provide
space necessary for prisoners to engage in the "right to reasonable physical exercise").
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pense in the abstract, methadone is a relatively inexpensive syn-
thetic substance, the purchase and distribution of which should not
unduly tax the financial resources of the prison system.
Finally, there is the widely held belief that any form of legalized
dependency on drugs is morally offensive, 22 a belief that generates
moral contempt for any use of methadone in prison or jail. If they
are inclined to think this way, prison officials may regard the pain
of abrupt withdrawal as the addict's just desert for his moral infirm-
ity.12
The moral justification for withholding treatment, however, is
patently unreasonable. First, it proves too much: one could justify
withholding treatment for any medical problem, such as syphillis or
slashed wrists, that was in some way self-inflicted on the theory that
the prisoner was simply suffering the consequences of his own im-
morality. Second, it is not clear why the moral standards of prison
officials, or their perception of societal standards, should have any
bearing on the prisoner's constitutional right to medical care. While
one of the purported purposes of incarceration is to teach prisoners
to abide by societal standards, this teaching process should be
confined to social, vocational, or psychological rehabilitation pro-
grams. The choice of treatment for physiological drug dependency
is a medical rather than a rehabilitative decision. The moral argu-
ment would seek to justify imposing medically unnecessary suffer-
ing on a prisoner as an exemplary punishment for being a drug
addict. The argument thus unwittingly concedes that abrupt with-
drawal is imposed solely for retributive purposes and hence may be
unconstitutional.
Thus, under the proposed formulation of the minority
standard, methadone-maintained prisoners and heroin addicts
would apparently have the right to short-term detoxification or
comparable treatment, absent special circumstances that justify
withholding treatment. Prison officials would not, however, be re-
quired to provide convicted drug-dependent prisoners with long-
term methadone maintenance because the officials are not under a
duty to provide rehabilitative treatment and because there is still
"2 Note, Methadone Maintenance for Heroin Addicts, 78 YALE L.J. 1175, 1185 (1969).
"I The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, which was amended to permit methadone
use, would suggest that, as a matter of federal policy, use of synthetic narcotics is not morally
offensive. See text and notes at notes 34-39 supra. It should also be noted that the Food and
Drug Administration implicitly sanctions, by way of regulation, all methadone maintenance
programs. See note 90 supra.
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substantial doubt as to whether long-term maintenance is a medi-
cally acceptable treatment. 24
B. The Pretrial Detainee
The question of whether pretrial detainees have a right to short-
term methadone detoxification or long-term maintenance is distin-
guishable from the question examined above-whether convicted
prisoners have those same rights. As an unconvicted person held
only under probable cause, the pretrial detainee may be treated as
a prisoner only to the extent necessary to ensure his presence at
trial.12r Conditions for pretrial detention of persons charged with a
crime must, therefore, not only be equal to, but in some cases must
exceed, those provided for convicted prisoners. 121
Since pretrial detainees have greater in-prison rights than con-
victed prisoners, it follows that they would possess any rights to
medical treatment-and therefore to methadone treatment-that
convicted prisoners would have. 2 In fact, pretrial detainees areprotected not against cruel and unusual punishment, but rather
against any punishment at all:' 28 due process requires that ajudicial determination of guilt precede punishment. 2 Thus, inJones v. Wittenberg,'" the court held that causing suffering by
summarily denying pretrial detainees effective treatment was un-
constitutional punishment-even though a reasoned denial might
not have breached the constitutional duty to provide medical care.
While it is clear that, at least in the jurisdictions employing the
minority standard, the pretrial detainee would have the right to
short-term methadone detoxification, the more significant question
is whether the pretrial detainee also has a right to methadone main-
tenance in circumstances in which it need not be provided to the
convicted prisoner. First, as a federal district court recognized in
Cudnik v. Kreiger,3' a pretrial detainee who is a participant in a
" See text and notes at notes 104-11 supra.
" Inmates of Milwaukee Cty. Jail v. Peterson, 353 F. Supp. 1157, 1160, 1166 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp.
1375, 1379 (D. Conn. 1971).
11 Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971). But see Kersh v. Bounds,
501 F.2d 585 (4th Cir. 1974).
12 Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
" Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
"3 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
" 3 Pm. L. Rpm. 221 (E.D. Ohio 1974). California has provided by statute that a de-
tainee who is a participant in a methadone maintenance program when incarcerated has a
right to continue in the program until he is convicted. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETrY CODE § 11222
(West Supp. 1974).
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registered long-term maintenance program has a strong claim to
continued maintenance while awaiting trial, since it is not necessary
to discontinue his treatment in order to ensure his presence at trial.
It is more difficult to determine whether an addict who is not
participating in a registered program can lay claim to methadone
maintenance while he is awaiting trial. Even though he is techni-
cally a free person, the prison cannot be obliged to allow him to
commit a felony in prison facilities by continuing his narcotics
habit. Assuming that the prison officials decide to wean the addict
of his physiological narcotics dependency, the question is whether
they must substitute methadone for his habit or may "cure" him
consonant with applicable eighth amendment standards.
No authority controls this case. It could be argued that prison
officials should not be obliged to substitute one disease for another
by substituting methadone for narcotics. But long-term mainte-
nance programs are premised on the conviction that maintenance
is, in fact, curative treatment designed to help eliminate the more
subtle, deeper causes of the disease. The question is a close one that
should eventually be decided on the basis of a medical evaluation
of maintenance treatment. In any event, even if a court were to
decide that prison authorities were free either to "cure" or maintain
the pretrial detainee, it should scrutinize the choice of treatment
with extra care. The court should be most reluctant to sanction the
use of the abrupt withdrawal "treatment," however, because the
addict detainee, who is technically a free citizen, could have ar-
ranged for the treatment of his choice had he not been kept under
custody to ensure his presence at trial.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, it is difficult to assert confidently that a
drug-dependent prisoner or pretrial detainee either does or does not
have a right to methadone detoxification or maintenance. Since
litigation has not yet conclusively tested the application of the pris-
oner's common law, statutory, or constitutional rights to medical
care in the case of the drug-dependent prisoner, any conclusion is
at best reasoned speculation. Yet one theme unites these various
strands of analysis: if short-term methadone detoxification is the
proper medical "cure" for physiological drug dependency, it is diffi-
cult to justify withholding it from a prisoner whose drug dependency
is to be eliminated. Under the common law and the various state
and federal statutes, forcing a prisoner to withdraw from narcotics
abruptly, even if his pain is eased to a certain extent by tranquiliz-
ers, would be actionable if withholding methadone were considered
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medical malpractice. Similarly, a drug-dependent prisoner or detai-
nee could compel the prescription of short-term methadone detoxifi-
cation or comparable treatment under the proposed formulation of
the minority standard of constitutionally mandated medical care if
it were the generally accepted medical treatment. There might not
be a right to such treatment under the majority standard, however,
because the prison officials' obligation is discharged by providing
"some," though not necessarily "adequate," medical treatment.
Yet it is possible that a right to methadone detoxification will even-
tually be recognized by equating the failure to provide detoxifica-
tion treatment with a total deprivation of care. Finally, because
there is no constitutional right to social rehabilitation for prisoners
and because the use of methadone for long-term maintenance has
not yet gained general medical acceptance, only pretrial detainees
who are already participating in regulated maintenance programs
when incarcerated would have any likelihood of success in demand-
ing long-term methadone maintenance while in jail.
Michael H. Slutsky
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